ref: 02ac617541ca1a7bf82b1615fb5a58235469b5d3
dir: /man/2/spki/
.TH SPKI 2
.SH NAME
SPKI: Cert, Hash, Key, Name, Seqel, Signature, Subject, Toplev, Valid \- simple public key infrastructure
.SH SYNOPSIS
.EX
include "bufio.m";
include "sexprs.m";
include "keyring.m";
include "spki.m";
spki := load SPKI SPKI->PATH;
Hash: adt {
alg: string;
hash: array of byte;
sexp: fn(h: self ref Hash): ref Sexprs->Sexp;
text: fn(h: self ref Hash): string;
eq: fn(h1: self ref Hash, h2: ref Hash): int;
};
Key: adt {
pk: ref Keyring->PK; # either pk/sk or hash might be nil
sk: ref Keyring->SK;
nbits: int;
halg: string; # basic signature hash algorithm
henc: string; # pre-signature encoding
hash: list of ref Hash;
hashed: fn(k: self ref Key, alg: string): array of byte;
hashexp: fn(k: self ref Key, alg: string): ref Hash;
public: fn(k: self ref Key): ref Key;
sigalg: fn(k: self ref Key): string;
text: fn(k: self ref Key): string;
sexp: fn(k: self ref Key): ref Sexprs->Sexp;
eq: fn(k1: self ref Key, k2: ref Key): int;
};
Name: adt {
principal: ref Key;
names: list of string;
isprincipal: fn(n: self ref Name): int;
local: fn(n: self ref Name): ref Name;
islocal: fn(n: self ref Name): int;
isprefix: fn(n1: self ref Name, n2: ref Name): int;
text: fn(n: self ref Name): string;
sexp: fn(n: self ref Name): ref Sexprs->Sexp;
eq: fn(n1: self ref Name, n2: ref Name): int;
};
Cert: adt {
e: ref Sexprs->Sexp; # S-expression, if originally parsed
issuer: ref Name;
subject: ref Subject;
valid: ref Valid;
pick {
A or KH or O => # auth, keyholder or object
delegate: int;
tag: ref Sexprs->Sexp;
N => # name
}
text: fn(c: self ref Cert): string;
sexp: fn(c: self ref Cert): ref Sexprs->Sexp;
};
Subject: adt {
pick{
P =>
key: ref Key;
N =>
name: ref Name;
O =>
hash: ref Hash;
KH =>
holder: ref Name;
T =>
k, n: int;
subs: cyclic list of ref Subject;
}
eq: fn(s1: self ref Subject, s2: ref Subject): int;
principal: fn(s: self ref Subject): ref Key;
text: fn(s: self ref Subject): string;
sexp: fn(s: self ref Subject): ref Sexprs->Sexp;
};
Signature: adt {
hash: ref Hash;
key: ref Key; # find by hash if necessary
sa: string; # alg[-[encoding-]hash
sig: list of (string, array of byte);
algs: fn(s: self ref Signature): (string, string, string);
sexp: fn(s: self ref Signature): ref Sexprs->Sexp;
text: fn(s: self ref Signature): string;
};
Seqel: adt {
pick{
C =>
c: ref Cert;
K =>
k: ref Key;
O =>
op: string;
args: list of ref Sexprs->Sexp;
S =>
sig: ref Signature;
E =>
exp: ref Sexprs->Sexp;
}
sexp: fn(se: self ref Seqeql): ref Sexprs->Sexp;
text: fn(se: self ref Seqel): string;
};
Valid: adt {
notbefore: string;
notafter: string;
intersect: fn(a: self Valid, b: Valid): (int, Valid);
text: fn(a: self Valid): string;
sexp: fn(a: self Valid): ref Sexprs->Sexp;
};
Toplev: adt {
pick {
C =>
v: ref Cert;
Sig =>
v: ref Signature;
K =>
v: ref Key;
Seq =>
v: list of ref Seqel;
}
sexp: fn(t: self ref Toplev): ref Sexprs->Sexp;
text: fn(t: self ref Toplev): string;
};
init: fn();
date2epoch: fn(s: string): int; # YYYY-MM-DD_HH:MM:SS
epoch2date: fn(t: int): string;
time2secs: fn(s: string): int; # HH:MM:SS
secs2time: fn(t: int): string;
sigalgs: fn(spec: string): (string, string, string);
# parse structures
parse: fn(s: ref Sexprs->Sexp): (ref Toplev, string);
parseseq: fn(s: ref Sexprs->Sexp): list of ref Seqel;
parsecert: fn(s: ref Sexprs->Sexp): ref Cert;
parsesig: fn(s: ref Sexprs->Sexp): ref Signature;
parsename: fn(s: ref Sexprs->Sexp): ref Name;
parsekey: fn(s: ref Sexprs->Sexp): ref Key;
parsehash: fn(s: ref Sexprs->Sexp): ref Hash;
parsecompound: fn(s: ref Sexprs->Sexp): ref Name;
parsevalid: fn(s: ref Sexprs->Sexp): ref Valid;
# signature checking
checksig: fn(c: ref Cert, sig: ref Signature): string;
sig2icert: fn(sig: ref Signature, signer: string, exp: int): ref Keyring->Certificate;
# signature making
signcert: fn(c: ref Cert, sigalg: string, key: ref Key):
(ref Signature, string);
signbytes: fn(a: array of byte, sigalg: string, key: ref Key):
(ref Signature, string);
# tags
maketag: fn(e: ref Sexprs->Sexp): ref Sexprs->Sexp;
tagintersect: fn(t1: ref Sexprs->Sexp, t2: ref Sexprs->Sexp):
ref Sexprs->Sexp;
tagimplies: fn(t1: ref Sexprs->Sexp, t2: ref Sexprs->Sexp): int;
# hash canonical s-expression
hashbytes: fn(a: array of byte, alg: string): array of byte;
hashexp: fn(e: ref Sexprs->Sexp, alg: string): array of byte;
.EE
.SH DESCRIPTION
.B SPKI
provides data types and operations to help build implementations of the Simple Public Key Infrastructure
(SPKI).
It provides types for hash values, public and private keys, local and extended names,
principals and compound principles, certificates, validity periods, signatures, and proof sequences.
It also provides operations on authorisation tags.
Externally, SPKI represents all such things as particular forms of S-expression, internally represented using
.B Sexprs->Sexp
from
.IR sexprs (2).
.PP
.B Init
must be called before invoking any other operation of the module.
.PP
Most types defined here provide several common operations:
.TP
.IB t1 .eq( t2 )
Return true iff values
.I t1
and
.I t2
are equal.
.TP
.IB t .sexp()
Return an S-expression
.I s
representing the value of
.IR t .
Subsequently, the
.B Sexp
operation
.IR s .pack()
will yield an array of bytes containing the value
.I t
in SPKI's canonical S-expression form.
.TP
.IB t .text()
Return a textual representation of the value
.IR t ;
it is often just the textual representation of the corresponding S-expression.
.PP
.B Hash
is the internal representation of hash values,
containing an
algorithm name
.B alg
and then the
.B hash
itself as an array of bytes.
SPKI entities such as the public key of a principal or a signed certificate are often represented by the hash
values of their corresponding S-expressions, where the hash value is later used as a compact way to refer
to the original entity.
For example, a
.B <principal>
is either a
.B <public-key>
or a
.BR <hash-of-key> ,
where the latter refers to some instance of the former.
Current hash algorithms are \f5"sha1"\fP and \f5"md5\fP.
A
.B Hash
value can be created from an S-expression representing a SPKI
.B <hash>
element
by
.BR parsehash .
It returns nil if the S-expression was ill-formed.
.PP
.B Key
represents public and private keys,
with an optional associated pre-hash encoding
.BR henc ,
the hash algorithm
.B halg
to be used when signing, and an optional list of
currently known hashes of the public component of the key itself.
SPKI identifies principals and public keys, thus each instance of a principal
in the other data structures is represented by a
.B Key
giving the corresponding public key, or its hash, or both.
Currently the public and private (secret) key values have types defined by
.IR keyring-intro (2).
A
.B Key
value can be created from an S-expression representing a SPKI
.B <public-key>
element by
.BR parsekey .
It returns nil if the S-expression was ill-formed.
For a given
.B Key
.IR k :
.TP
.IB k .ishash()
Returns true if
.I k
is just a hash of a key, with no public or private components.
.TP
.IB k .public()
Returns the public key for
.IR k ,
which is simply
.I k
if it is already a public key, but if it
is a private key, then a new key is returned
that has only public components.
.B Public
returns a nil value if
.I k
is just a hash of a key value.
.TP
.IB k .sigalg()
Returns the SPKI signature algorithm for the key.
.TP
.IB k .hashed( alg )
Return an array of bytes giving the hash of the Key
.I k
using algorithm
.IR alg .
It returns nil if
.IB k .ishash()
is true, and
.I k
has no associated hash value for
.IR alg .
.TP
.IB k .hashexp( alg )
Similar to
.BR hashed ,
but returns a
.B Hash
value instead of the raw data.
.PP
.B Name
represents both local and extended names, and simple principals consisting of just a key.
The field
.B principal
gives the key that defines the name space in which the list of names is interpreted.
For simple principles, the list of
.B names
is nil.
A local name has exactly one name in the list.
Two parsing functions convert to
.B Name
from S-expressions.
.B Parsename
parses a SPKI
.B <name>
element:
.BI (name
[
.I principal
]
.I name
\&...
.BR ),
where
.I principal is either a
.B <public-key>
or a
.B <hash>
element.
.B Parsecompound
accepts either a
.B <name>
element as above, or a
.B <public-key>
or its
.BR <hash> .
Both functions return nil if the S-expression is ill-formed.
.PP
.B Subject
represents the subjects of SPKI name and authorisation certificates.
It has several variants in a
.B pick
adt, with suitable fields for each variant:
.TP
.B Subject.P
A simple principal: a
.BR key .
.TP
.B Subject.N
A group of principals or a delayed binding to a principal: a
.BR name .
.TP
.B Subject.O
The
.B hash
of an object.
.TP
.B Subject.KH
A keyholder certificate, that says something about a key's
.B holder
(represented by a
.BR Name ).
.TP
.B Subject.T
A
.I threshold
subject, used only in authorisation certificates.
The
.I n
subsidiary subjects are listed in
.BR subs ;
of those, at least
.I k
must sign a request for it to be authorised.
.TP
.B Subject
provides the common operations
.BR eq ,
.B sexp
and
.BR text ,
and a further operation:
.TP
.IB s .principal()
If
.I s
is a simple principal or a name, return the
.B Key
defining the principal, if known; return nil otherwise.
.PP
Subjects appear only as a subsidiary item in certificates and do not have a parsing function.
.PP
.B Cert
represents SPKI certificates.
There are four variants, represented by a pick adt:
.B Cert.A
(authorisation);
.B Cert.KH
(keyholder);
.B Cert.O
(object); and
.B Cert.N
(name).
The following fields and operations are common to all variants:
.TP
.B e
original S-expression (if created by
.BR parsecert )
to allow hashes and signatures to be computed on the SPKI canonical form of the certificate
.TP
.B issuer
The simple principal (represented as a name) that issued an authorisation, keyholder or object certificate,
or the
.B <issuer-name>
of a name certificate (allowing both local and extended names not just simple principals).
.TP
.B subject
The
.B Subject
of the certificate.
Name certificates may not have threshold subjects.
.TP
.B valid
Optional restriction on the certificate's validity
(see
.B Valid
for details).
.PP
Name certificates have only the fields above; the others have several more fields:
.TP
.B
delegate
True iff the certificate carries delegation rights (ie,
.B (propagate)
in the S-expression representation).
.TP
.B tag
An S-expression that expresses the authority granted by the certificate.
The expression
.B "(tag (*))"
means `all permissions'.
.PP
A
.B Cert
value
can be created from an S-expression representing a SPKI
.B <cert>
element by
.BR parsecert .
It returns nil if the expression was ill-formed.
.PP
SPKI
.B tag
expressions, represented internally by
.B Sexprs->Sexpr
trees, form a partial order,
including the pattern operations
.BR (*) ,
.BR "(* set " ...
.BR ),
.BR "(* prefix " ...
.BR ),
.BR "(* range " ...
.BR ),
and as an extension,
.BR "(* suffix " ...
.BR ).
Given two tag expressions
.I t1
and
.IR t2 ,
.I tagintersect
returns a tag expression representing
.I t1
∩
.IR t2 ;
.B tagimplies
returns true iff tag
.I t1
implies tag
.IR t2 :
(\fIt1\fP∩\fIt2\fP)=\fIt2\fP.
Both functions work correctly when
.I t1
and
.I t2
contain any legal combination of pattern operations.
.PP
SPKI structures are converted to a canonical form of S-expression to be hashed or signed
(with or without hashing).
.B Hashbytes
returns an array of bytes containing the result of hashing array
.I a
using hash algorithm
.I alg
(either
.B sha1
or
.BR md5 ).
.B Hashexp
returns an array of bytes containing the hash of the canonical form of expression
.I e
using hash algorithm
.IR alg .
.PP
.B Signature
associates
.B hash ,
the
.B Hash
value of something (eg, a public key) with the result of applying a public-key signature
algorithm
.B sa
to that hash value.
The name of the algorithm has the form
.IP
.EX
\fIalg\fP\fR[-[\fP\fIencoding\fP\fR-]\fP\fIhash\fP\fR]\fP
.EE
with up to three subcomponents (separated by dashes),
where
.I alg
is a public key algorithm such as
.B rsa
or
.BR dsa ,
.I encoding
is an optional encoding to apply to the value before signing,
and
.I hash
is the secure hash algorithm to apply to the encoded value before signing.
For example, the usual algorithms for RSA keys are
.B rsa-pkcs1-sha1
and
.BR rsa-pkcs1-md5 .
.PP
Signatures are created by
.BR signcert ,
which signs a SPKI certificate represented by
.I c
with
.I key
using the signature algorithm
.IR sigalg .
.I Key
must contain both public and secret (private) components.
Any other binary data can be signed by
.BR signbytes ,
which signs arbitrary data represented by an array of bytes
.IR a .
Both functions apply any encoding and hash algorithms mentioned by
.IR sigalg ,
and return a tuple
.BI ( sig , err ).
On success,
.I sig
refers to a
.B Signature
value that can be converted to an S-expression using
.IB sig .sexp()
and
.I err
is nil.
On an error,
.I sig
is nil and
.I err
contains a diagnostic.
.PP
A certificate's signature can be checked by
.BR checksig .
If
.I sig
is a valid signature for certificate
.IR c ,
.B checksig
returns nil.
If the signature is invalid,
.I checksig
returns a diagnostic.
.SH SOURCE
.B /appl/lib/spki.b
.SH SEE ALSO
.IR bufio (2),
.IR sexprs (2),
.IR spki-verifier (2)