ref: 94f2907dc40a6415a10c252cb9ba3971f1f7e838
dir: /third_party/boringssl/src/crypto/hpke/hpke_test.cc/
/* Copyright (c) 2020, Google Inc.
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
* SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
* OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
* CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */
#include <openssl/hpke.h>
#include <cstdint>
#include <limits>
#include <string>
#include <vector>
#include <gtest/gtest.h>
#include <openssl/base.h>
#include <openssl/curve25519.h>
#include <openssl/digest.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/sha.h>
#include <openssl/span.h>
#include "../test/file_test.h"
#include "../test/test_util.h"
BSSL_NAMESPACE_BEGIN
namespace {
const decltype(&EVP_hpke_x25519_hkdf_sha256) kAllKEMs[] = {
&EVP_hpke_p256_hkdf_sha256,
&EVP_hpke_x25519_hkdf_sha256,
};
const decltype(&EVP_hpke_aes_128_gcm) kAllAEADs[] = {
&EVP_hpke_aes_128_gcm,
&EVP_hpke_aes_256_gcm,
&EVP_hpke_chacha20_poly1305,
};
const decltype(&EVP_hpke_hkdf_sha256) kAllKDFs[] = {
&EVP_hpke_hkdf_sha256,
};
// HPKETestVector corresponds to one array member in the published
// test-vectors.json.
class HPKETestVector {
public:
explicit HPKETestVector() = default;
~HPKETestVector() = default;
bool ReadFromFileTest(FileTest *t);
void Verify() const {
const EVP_HPKE_KEM *kem = GetKEM();
const EVP_HPKE_AEAD *aead = GetAEAD();
ASSERT_TRUE(aead);
const EVP_HPKE_KDF *kdf = GetKDF();
ASSERT_TRUE(kdf);
// Test the sender.
ScopedEVP_HPKE_CTX sender_ctx;
uint8_t enc[EVP_HPKE_MAX_ENC_LENGTH];
size_t enc_len = 0;
// X25519 uses the secret key directly. P-256 uses the IKM to derive a key.
bssl::Span<const uint8_t> secret_input = secret_key_e_;
if (kem_id_ == EVP_HPKE_DHKEM_P256_HKDF_SHA256) {
secret_input = ikm_e_;
}
switch (mode_) {
case Mode::kBase:
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_HPKE_CTX_setup_sender_with_seed_for_testing(
sender_ctx.get(), enc, &enc_len, sizeof(enc), kem, kdf, aead,
public_key_r_.data(), public_key_r_.size(), info_.data(),
info_.size(), secret_input.data(), secret_input.size()));
break;
case Mode::kAuth: {
ScopedEVP_HPKE_KEY sender_key;
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_HPKE_KEY_init(
sender_key.get(), kem, secret_key_s_.data(), secret_key_s_.size()));
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_HPKE_CTX_setup_auth_sender_with_seed_for_testing(
sender_ctx.get(), enc, &enc_len, sizeof(enc), sender_key.get(), kdf,
aead, public_key_r_.data(), public_key_r_.size(), info_.data(),
info_.size(), secret_input.data(), secret_input.size()));
break;
}
}
EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(enc, enc_len), Bytes(public_key_e_));
VerifySender(sender_ctx.get());
// Test the recipient.
ScopedEVP_HPKE_KEY base_key;
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_HPKE_KEY_init(base_key.get(), kem, secret_key_r_.data(),
secret_key_r_.size()));
enum class CopyMode { kOriginal, kCopy, kMove };
for (CopyMode copy :
{CopyMode::kOriginal, CopyMode::kCopy, CopyMode::kMove}) {
SCOPED_TRACE(static_cast<int>(copy));
const EVP_HPKE_KEY *key = base_key.get();
ScopedEVP_HPKE_KEY key_copy;
switch (copy) {
case CopyMode::kOriginal:
break;
case CopyMode::kCopy:
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_HPKE_KEY_copy(key_copy.get(), base_key.get()));
key = key_copy.get();
break;
case CopyMode::kMove:
EVP_HPKE_KEY_move(key_copy.get(), base_key.get());
key = key_copy.get();
break;
}
uint8_t public_key[EVP_HPKE_MAX_PUBLIC_KEY_LENGTH];
size_t public_key_len;
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_HPKE_KEY_public_key(key, public_key, &public_key_len,
sizeof(public_key)));
EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(public_key, public_key_len), Bytes(public_key_r_));
uint8_t private_key[EVP_HPKE_MAX_PRIVATE_KEY_LENGTH];
size_t private_key_len;
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_HPKE_KEY_private_key(key, private_key, &private_key_len,
sizeof(private_key)));
EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(private_key, private_key_len), Bytes(secret_key_r_));
// Set up the recipient.
ScopedEVP_HPKE_CTX recipient_ctx;
switch (mode_) {
case Mode::kBase:
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_HPKE_CTX_setup_recipient(recipient_ctx.get(), key,
kdf, aead, enc, enc_len,
info_.data(), info_.size()));
break;
case Mode::kAuth:
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_HPKE_CTX_setup_auth_recipient(
recipient_ctx.get(), key, kdf, aead, enc, enc_len, info_.data(),
info_.size(), public_key_s_.data(), public_key_s_.size()));
break;
}
VerifyRecipient(recipient_ctx.get());
}
}
private:
const EVP_HPKE_KEM *GetKEM() const {
for (const auto kem : kAllKEMs) {
if (EVP_HPKE_KEM_id(kem()) == kem_id_) {
return kem();
}
}
return nullptr;
}
const EVP_HPKE_AEAD *GetAEAD() const {
for (const auto aead : kAllAEADs) {
if (EVP_HPKE_AEAD_id(aead()) == aead_id_) {
return aead();
}
}
return nullptr;
}
const EVP_HPKE_KDF *GetKDF() const {
for (const auto kdf : kAllKDFs) {
if (EVP_HPKE_KDF_id(kdf()) == kdf_id_) {
return kdf();
}
}
return nullptr;
}
void VerifySender(EVP_HPKE_CTX *ctx) const {
for (const Encryption &task : encryptions_) {
std::vector<uint8_t> encrypted(task.plaintext.size() +
EVP_HPKE_CTX_max_overhead(ctx));
size_t encrypted_len;
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_HPKE_CTX_seal(ctx, encrypted.data(), &encrypted_len,
encrypted.size(), task.plaintext.data(),
task.plaintext.size(), task.aad.data(),
task.aad.size()));
ASSERT_EQ(Bytes(encrypted.data(), encrypted_len), Bytes(task.ciphertext));
}
VerifyExports(ctx);
}
void VerifyRecipient(EVP_HPKE_CTX *ctx) const {
for (const Encryption &task : encryptions_) {
std::vector<uint8_t> decrypted(task.ciphertext.size());
size_t decrypted_len;
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_HPKE_CTX_open(ctx, decrypted.data(), &decrypted_len,
decrypted.size(), task.ciphertext.data(),
task.ciphertext.size(), task.aad.data(),
task.aad.size()));
ASSERT_EQ(Bytes(decrypted.data(), decrypted_len), Bytes(task.plaintext));
}
VerifyExports(ctx);
}
void VerifyExports(EVP_HPKE_CTX *ctx) const {
for (const Export &task : exports_) {
std::vector<uint8_t> exported_secret(task.export_length);
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_HPKE_CTX_export(
ctx, exported_secret.data(), exported_secret.size(),
task.exporter_context.data(), task.exporter_context.size()));
ASSERT_EQ(Bytes(exported_secret), Bytes(task.exported_value));
}
}
enum class Mode {
kBase = 0,
kAuth = 2,
};
struct Encryption {
std::vector<uint8_t> aad;
std::vector<uint8_t> ciphertext;
std::vector<uint8_t> plaintext;
};
struct Export {
std::vector<uint8_t> exporter_context;
size_t export_length;
std::vector<uint8_t> exported_value;
};
Mode mode_;
uint16_t kem_id_;
uint16_t kdf_id_;
uint16_t aead_id_;
std::vector<uint8_t> context_;
std::vector<uint8_t> info_;
std::vector<uint8_t> public_key_e_;
std::vector<uint8_t> secret_key_e_;
std::vector<uint8_t> ikm_e_;
std::vector<uint8_t> public_key_r_;
std::vector<uint8_t> secret_key_r_;
std::vector<uint8_t> ikm_r_;
std::vector<uint8_t> public_key_s_;
std::vector<uint8_t> secret_key_s_;
std::vector<Encryption> encryptions_;
std::vector<Export> exports_;
};
// Match FileTest's naming scheme for duplicated attribute names.
std::string BuildAttrName(const std::string &name, int iter) {
return iter == 1 ? name : name + "/" + std::to_string(iter);
}
// Parses |s| as an unsigned integer of type T and writes the value to |out|.
// Returns true on success. If the integer value exceeds the maximum T value,
// returns false.
template <typename T>
bool ParseIntSafe(T *out, const std::string &s) {
T value = 0;
for (char c : s) {
if (c < '0' || c > '9') {
return false;
}
if (value > (std::numeric_limits<T>::max() - (c - '0')) / 10) {
return false;
}
value = 10 * value + (c - '0');
}
*out = value;
return true;
}
// Read the |key| attribute from |file_test| and convert it to an integer.
template <typename T>
bool FileTestReadInt(FileTest *file_test, T *out, const std::string &key) {
std::string s;
return file_test->GetAttribute(&s, key) && ParseIntSafe(out, s);
}
bool HPKETestVector::ReadFromFileTest(FileTest *t) {
uint8_t mode = 0;
if (!FileTestReadInt(t, &mode, "mode") ||
!FileTestReadInt(t, &kem_id_, "kem_id") ||
!FileTestReadInt(t, &kdf_id_, "kdf_id") ||
!FileTestReadInt(t, &aead_id_, "aead_id") ||
!t->GetBytes(&info_, "info") || //
!t->GetBytes(&secret_key_r_, "skRm") ||
!t->GetBytes(&public_key_r_, "pkRm") ||
!t->GetBytes(&ikm_r_, "ikmR") || //
!t->GetBytes(&secret_key_e_, "skEm") ||
!t->GetBytes(&public_key_e_, "pkEm") || //
!t->GetBytes(&ikm_e_, "ikmE")) {
return false;
}
switch (mode) {
case static_cast<int>(Mode::kBase):
mode_ = Mode::kBase;
break;
case static_cast<int>(Mode::kAuth):
mode_ = Mode::kAuth;
if (!t->GetBytes(&secret_key_s_, "skSm") ||
!t->GetBytes(&public_key_s_, "pkSm")) {
return false;
}
break;
default:
return false;
}
for (int i = 1; t->HasAttribute(BuildAttrName("aad", i)); i++) {
Encryption encryption;
if (!t->GetBytes(&encryption.aad, BuildAttrName("aad", i)) ||
!t->GetBytes(&encryption.ciphertext, BuildAttrName("ct", i)) ||
!t->GetBytes(&encryption.plaintext, BuildAttrName("pt", i))) {
return false;
}
encryptions_.push_back(std::move(encryption));
}
for (int i = 1; t->HasAttribute(BuildAttrName("exporter_context", i)); i++) {
Export exp;
if (!t->GetBytes(&exp.exporter_context,
BuildAttrName("exporter_context", i)) ||
!FileTestReadInt(t, &exp.export_length, BuildAttrName("L", i)) ||
!t->GetBytes(&exp.exported_value, BuildAttrName("exported_value", i))) {
return false;
}
exports_.push_back(std::move(exp));
}
return true;
}
} // namespace
TEST(HPKETest, VerifyTestVectors) {
FileTestGTest("crypto/hpke/hpke_test_vectors.txt", [](FileTest *t) {
HPKETestVector test_vec;
EXPECT_TRUE(test_vec.ReadFromFileTest(t));
test_vec.Verify();
});
}
// The test vectors used fixed sender ephemeral keys, while HPKE itself
// generates new keys for each context. Test this codepath by checking we can
// decrypt our own messages.
TEST(HPKETest, RoundTrip) {
const uint8_t info_a[] = {1, 1, 2, 3, 5, 8};
const uint8_t info_b[] = {42, 42, 42};
const uint8_t ad_a[] = {1, 2, 4, 8, 16};
const uint8_t ad_b[] = {7};
Span<const uint8_t> info_values[] = {{nullptr, 0}, info_a, info_b};
Span<const uint8_t> ad_values[] = {{nullptr, 0}, ad_a, ad_b};
for (const auto kem : kAllKEMs) {
SCOPED_TRACE(EVP_HPKE_KEM_id(kem()));
// Generate the recipient's keypair.
ScopedEVP_HPKE_KEY key;
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_HPKE_KEY_generate(key.get(), kem()));
uint8_t public_key_r[EVP_HPKE_MAX_PUBLIC_KEY_LENGTH];
size_t public_key_r_len;
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_HPKE_KEY_public_key(
key.get(), public_key_r, &public_key_r_len, sizeof(public_key_r)));
// Generate the sender's keypair, for auth modes.
ScopedEVP_HPKE_KEY sender_key;
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_HPKE_KEY_generate(sender_key.get(), kem()));
uint8_t public_key_s[EVP_HPKE_MAX_PUBLIC_KEY_LENGTH];
size_t public_key_s_len;
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_HPKE_KEY_public_key(sender_key.get(), public_key_s,
&public_key_s_len,
sizeof(public_key_s)));
for (const auto kdf : kAllKDFs) {
SCOPED_TRACE(EVP_HPKE_KDF_id(kdf()));
for (const auto aead : kAllAEADs) {
SCOPED_TRACE(EVP_HPKE_AEAD_id(aead()));
for (const Span<const uint8_t> &info : info_values) {
SCOPED_TRACE(Bytes(info));
for (const Span<const uint8_t> &ad : ad_values) {
SCOPED_TRACE(Bytes(ad));
auto check_messages = [&](EVP_HPKE_CTX *sender_ctx,
EVP_HPKE_CTX *recipient_ctx) {
const char kCleartextPayload[] = "foobar";
// Have sender encrypt message for the recipient.
std::vector<uint8_t> ciphertext(
sizeof(kCleartextPayload) +
EVP_HPKE_CTX_max_overhead(sender_ctx));
size_t ciphertext_len;
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_HPKE_CTX_seal(
sender_ctx, ciphertext.data(), &ciphertext_len,
ciphertext.size(),
reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t *>(kCleartextPayload),
sizeof(kCleartextPayload), ad.data(), ad.size()));
// Have recipient decrypt the message.
std::vector<uint8_t> cleartext(ciphertext.size());
size_t cleartext_len;
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_HPKE_CTX_open(recipient_ctx, cleartext.data(),
&cleartext_len, cleartext.size(),
ciphertext.data(), ciphertext_len,
ad.data(), ad.size()));
// Verify that decrypted message matches the original.
ASSERT_EQ(Bytes(cleartext.data(), cleartext_len),
Bytes(kCleartextPayload, sizeof(kCleartextPayload)));
};
// Test the base mode.
{
ScopedEVP_HPKE_CTX sender_ctx;
uint8_t enc[EVP_HPKE_MAX_PUBLIC_KEY_LENGTH];
size_t enc_len;
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_HPKE_CTX_setup_sender(
sender_ctx.get(), enc, &enc_len, sizeof(enc), kem(), kdf(),
aead(), public_key_r, public_key_r_len, info.data(),
info.size()));
ScopedEVP_HPKE_CTX recipient_ctx;
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_HPKE_CTX_setup_recipient(
recipient_ctx.get(), key.get(), kdf(), aead(), enc, enc_len,
info.data(), info.size()));
check_messages(sender_ctx.get(), recipient_ctx.get());
}
// Test the auth mode.
{
ScopedEVP_HPKE_CTX sender_ctx;
uint8_t enc[EVP_HPKE_MAX_PUBLIC_KEY_LENGTH];
size_t enc_len;
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_HPKE_CTX_setup_auth_sender(
sender_ctx.get(), enc, &enc_len, sizeof(enc),
sender_key.get(), kdf(), aead(), public_key_r,
public_key_r_len, info.data(), info.size()));
ScopedEVP_HPKE_CTX recipient_ctx;
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_HPKE_CTX_setup_auth_recipient(
recipient_ctx.get(), key.get(), kdf(), aead(), enc, enc_len,
info.data(), info.size(), public_key_s, public_key_s_len));
check_messages(sender_ctx.get(), recipient_ctx.get());
}
}
}
}
}
}
}
// Verify that the DH operations inside Encap() and Decap() both fail when the
// public key is on a small-order point in the curve.
TEST(HPKETest, X25519EncapSmallOrderPoint) {
// Borrowed from X25519Test.SmallOrder.
static const uint8_t kSmallOrderPoint[32] = {
0xe0, 0xeb, 0x7a, 0x7c, 0x3b, 0x41, 0xb8, 0xae, 0x16, 0x56, 0xe3,
0xfa, 0xf1, 0x9f, 0xc4, 0x6a, 0xda, 0x09, 0x8d, 0xeb, 0x9c, 0x32,
0xb1, 0xfd, 0x86, 0x62, 0x05, 0x16, 0x5f, 0x49, 0xb8,
};
static const uint8_t kValidPoint[32] = {
0xe6, 0xdb, 0x68, 0x67, 0x58, 0x30, 0x30, 0xdb, 0x35, 0x94, 0xc1,
0xa4, 0x24, 0xb1, 0x5f, 0x7c, 0x72, 0x66, 0x24, 0xec, 0x26, 0xb3,
0x35, 0x3b, 0x10, 0xa9, 0x03, 0xa6, 0xd0, 0xab, 0x1c, 0x4c,
};
ScopedEVP_HPKE_KEY key;
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_HPKE_KEY_generate(key.get(), EVP_hpke_x25519_hkdf_sha256()));
for (const auto kdf : kAllKDFs) {
SCOPED_TRACE(EVP_HPKE_KDF_id(kdf()));
for (const auto aead : kAllAEADs) {
SCOPED_TRACE(EVP_HPKE_AEAD_id(aead()));
// Set up the sender, passing in kSmallOrderPoint as |peer_public_key|.
ScopedEVP_HPKE_CTX sender_ctx;
uint8_t enc[X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN];
size_t enc_len;
EXPECT_FALSE(EVP_HPKE_CTX_setup_sender(
sender_ctx.get(), enc, &enc_len, sizeof(enc),
EVP_hpke_x25519_hkdf_sha256(), kdf(), aead(), kSmallOrderPoint,
sizeof(kSmallOrderPoint), nullptr, 0));
// Likewise with auth.
EXPECT_FALSE(EVP_HPKE_CTX_setup_auth_sender(
sender_ctx.get(), enc, &enc_len, sizeof(enc), key.get(), kdf(),
aead(), kSmallOrderPoint, sizeof(kSmallOrderPoint), nullptr, 0));
// Set up the recipient, passing in kSmallOrderPoint as |enc|.
ScopedEVP_HPKE_CTX recipient_ctx;
EXPECT_FALSE(EVP_HPKE_CTX_setup_recipient(
recipient_ctx.get(), key.get(), kdf(), aead(), kSmallOrderPoint,
sizeof(kSmallOrderPoint), nullptr, 0));
// Likewise with auth. With auth, a small-order point could appear as
// either |enc| or the peer public key.
EXPECT_FALSE(EVP_HPKE_CTX_setup_auth_recipient(
recipient_ctx.get(), key.get(), kdf(), aead(), kSmallOrderPoint,
sizeof(kSmallOrderPoint), nullptr, 0, kValidPoint,
sizeof(kValidPoint)));
EXPECT_FALSE(EVP_HPKE_CTX_setup_auth_recipient(
recipient_ctx.get(), key.get(), kdf(), aead(), kValidPoint,
sizeof(kValidPoint), nullptr, 0, kSmallOrderPoint,
sizeof(kSmallOrderPoint)));
}
}
}
// Test that Seal() fails when the context has been initialized as a recipient.
TEST(HPKETest, RecipientInvalidSeal) {
const uint8_t kMockEnc[X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN] = {0xff};
const char kCleartextPayload[] = "foobar";
ScopedEVP_HPKE_KEY key;
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_HPKE_KEY_generate(key.get(), EVP_hpke_x25519_hkdf_sha256()));
// Set up the recipient.
ScopedEVP_HPKE_CTX recipient_ctx;
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_HPKE_CTX_setup_recipient(
recipient_ctx.get(), key.get(), EVP_hpke_hkdf_sha256(),
EVP_hpke_aes_128_gcm(), kMockEnc, sizeof(kMockEnc), nullptr, 0));
// Call Seal() on the recipient.
size_t ciphertext_len;
uint8_t ciphertext[100];
ASSERT_FALSE(EVP_HPKE_CTX_seal(
recipient_ctx.get(), ciphertext, &ciphertext_len, sizeof(ciphertext),
reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t *>(kCleartextPayload),
sizeof(kCleartextPayload), nullptr, 0));
}
// Test that Open() fails when the context has been initialized as a sender.
TEST(HPKETest, SenderInvalidOpen) {
const uint8_t kMockCiphertext[100] = {0xff};
const size_t kMockCiphertextLen = 80;
// Generate the recipient's keypair.
uint8_t secret_key_r[X25519_PRIVATE_KEY_LEN];
uint8_t public_key_r[X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN];
X25519_keypair(public_key_r, secret_key_r);
// Set up the sender.
ScopedEVP_HPKE_CTX sender_ctx;
uint8_t enc[X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN];
size_t enc_len;
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_HPKE_CTX_setup_sender(
sender_ctx.get(), enc, &enc_len, sizeof(enc),
EVP_hpke_x25519_hkdf_sha256(), EVP_hpke_hkdf_sha256(),
EVP_hpke_aes_128_gcm(), public_key_r, sizeof(public_key_r), nullptr, 0));
// Call Open() on the sender.
uint8_t cleartext[128];
size_t cleartext_len;
ASSERT_FALSE(EVP_HPKE_CTX_open(sender_ctx.get(), cleartext, &cleartext_len,
sizeof(cleartext), kMockCiphertext,
kMockCiphertextLen, nullptr, 0));
}
TEST(HPKETest, SetupSenderBufferTooSmall) {
uint8_t secret_key_r[X25519_PRIVATE_KEY_LEN];
uint8_t public_key_r[X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN];
X25519_keypair(public_key_r, secret_key_r);
ScopedEVP_HPKE_CTX sender_ctx;
uint8_t enc[X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN - 1];
size_t enc_len;
ASSERT_FALSE(EVP_HPKE_CTX_setup_sender(
sender_ctx.get(), enc, &enc_len, sizeof(enc),
EVP_hpke_x25519_hkdf_sha256(), EVP_hpke_hkdf_sha256(),
EVP_hpke_aes_128_gcm(), public_key_r, sizeof(public_key_r), nullptr, 0));
EXPECT_TRUE(
ErrorEquals(ERR_get_error(), ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_BUFFER_SIZE));
ERR_clear_error();
}
TEST(HPKETest, SetupSenderBufferTooLarge) {
uint8_t secret_key_r[X25519_PRIVATE_KEY_LEN];
uint8_t public_key_r[X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN];
X25519_keypair(public_key_r, secret_key_r);
// Too large of an output buffer is fine because the function reports the
// actual length.
ScopedEVP_HPKE_CTX sender_ctx;
uint8_t enc[X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN + 1];
size_t enc_len;
EXPECT_TRUE(EVP_HPKE_CTX_setup_sender(
sender_ctx.get(), enc, &enc_len, sizeof(enc),
EVP_hpke_x25519_hkdf_sha256(), EVP_hpke_hkdf_sha256(),
EVP_hpke_aes_128_gcm(), public_key_r, sizeof(public_key_r), nullptr, 0));
EXPECT_EQ(size_t{X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN}, enc_len);
}
TEST(HPKETest, SetupRecipientWrongLengthEnc) {
ScopedEVP_HPKE_KEY key;
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_HPKE_KEY_generate(key.get(), EVP_hpke_x25519_hkdf_sha256()));
const uint8_t bogus_enc[X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN + 5] = {0xff};
ScopedEVP_HPKE_CTX recipient_ctx;
ASSERT_FALSE(EVP_HPKE_CTX_setup_recipient(
recipient_ctx.get(), key.get(), EVP_hpke_hkdf_sha256(),
EVP_hpke_aes_128_gcm(), bogus_enc, sizeof(bogus_enc), nullptr, 0));
EXPECT_TRUE(
ErrorEquals(ERR_get_error(), ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_PEER_KEY));
ERR_clear_error();
}
TEST(HPKETest, SetupSenderWrongLengthPeerPublicValue) {
const uint8_t bogus_public_key_r[X25519_PRIVATE_KEY_LEN + 5] = {0xff};
ScopedEVP_HPKE_CTX sender_ctx;
uint8_t enc[X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN];
size_t enc_len;
ASSERT_FALSE(EVP_HPKE_CTX_setup_sender(
sender_ctx.get(), enc, &enc_len, sizeof(enc),
EVP_hpke_x25519_hkdf_sha256(), EVP_hpke_hkdf_sha256(),
EVP_hpke_aes_128_gcm(), bogus_public_key_r, sizeof(bogus_public_key_r),
nullptr, 0));
EXPECT_TRUE(
ErrorEquals(ERR_get_error(), ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_PEER_KEY));
ERR_clear_error();
}
TEST(HPKETest, InvalidRecipientKey) {
const uint8_t private_key[X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN + 5] = {0xff};
ScopedEVP_HPKE_KEY key;
EXPECT_FALSE(EVP_HPKE_KEY_init(key.get(), EVP_hpke_x25519_hkdf_sha256(),
private_key, sizeof(private_key)));
}
TEST(HPKETest, InvalidP256PrivateKey) {
const uint8_t zero_key[32] = {0};
ScopedEVP_HPKE_KEY key;
EXPECT_FALSE(EVP_HPKE_KEY_init(key.get(), EVP_hpke_p256_hkdf_sha256(),
zero_key, sizeof(zero_key)));
uint8_t all_ones_key[32];
OPENSSL_memset(all_ones_key, 0xff, sizeof(all_ones_key));
EXPECT_FALSE(EVP_HPKE_KEY_init(key.get(), EVP_hpke_p256_hkdf_sha256(),
all_ones_key, sizeof(all_ones_key)));
}
TEST(HPKETest, InternalParseIntSafe) {
uint8_t u8 = 0xff;
ASSERT_FALSE(ParseIntSafe(&u8, "-1"));
ASSERT_TRUE(ParseIntSafe(&u8, "0"));
ASSERT_EQ(u8, 0);
ASSERT_TRUE(ParseIntSafe(&u8, "255"));
ASSERT_EQ(u8, 255);
ASSERT_FALSE(ParseIntSafe(&u8, "256"));
uint16_t u16 = 0xffff;
ASSERT_TRUE(ParseIntSafe(&u16, "257"));
ASSERT_EQ(u16, 257);
ASSERT_TRUE(ParseIntSafe(&u16, "65535"));
ASSERT_EQ(u16, 65535);
ASSERT_FALSE(ParseIntSafe(&u16, "65536"));
}
BSSL_NAMESPACE_END